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Abstract
People often offer an excuse or an apology after they do something wrong. In this paper, we examine how giving an excuse, an
apology, or no explanation after arriving late to a meeting influences the attitudes and behavioral intentions others form toward
the late arrival. Additionally, we examined how a group-related factor (complaining) and the late arrival’s history with coming
late affected participant judgments. Across two studies using complementary experimental and surveymethods, we found that an
excuse is better than no explanation, but that the difference between apology and no explanation and apology and excuse is not
always clear. Furthermore, we found that common distinctions between explanation types used in the literature may not fully
exist in non-laboratory social interactions. Implications of these findings and future directions are discussed.
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People often commit social transgressions in the work envi-
ronment, and the consequences can range from degraded in-
terpersonal relationships to impaired work performance
(Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). A social transgression need
not be a dramatic, abusive behavior such as yelling or stealing.
Indeed, some social transgressions are quite mundane and
common, yet nonetheless provoke negative responses from
others. Lateness to workplace meetings is one such common
social transgression that is associated with interpersonal con-
flict, and previous work suggests that the type of explanation a
late arrival provides—whether it implicates a controllable or
an uncontrollable cause—can greatly affect how others re-
spond to the transgression (Mroz & Allen, 2017; Rogelberg
et al., 2014).
Although there is much literature on the different types of
explanations, no research, to our knowledge, has pitted types
of explanations against the outcomes that occur when the
transgressing individual simply does not acknowledge the
behavior. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold.
First, in the meeting lateness context, we examine how on-
time attendees respond when someone arrives late and: (a)
provides an excuse (b) provides an apology, or (c) does not
acknowledge arriving late. The findings related to this purpose
contribute to the literature by providing additional clarity as to
the type of explanation most effective in reducing negative
responses. Second, we explore how a group factor (whether
the group complains or does not complain) and the individ-
ual’s history with lateness to meetings affects participant re-
sponses. The second purpose seeks to integrate group and
other contextual factors that can provide a more nuanced un-
derstanding of when explanations are useful in social settings.
Purpose and Types of Explanations
When an individual breaks a social rule governing appropriate
behavior, that individual typically offers an apology, excuse,
or justification—collectively referred to as explanations—to
anyone affected by the transgressive behavior (Bies & Sitkin,
1992; Schlenker, 1997; Tyler & Feldman, 2007). An apology
includes expressing sorrow, acknowledging the wrongfulness
of the act, and accepting responsibility for it, while promoting
a sense of remorse, repentance, and humility (Fisher & Exline,
2006; Tavuchis, 1991). An excuse lacks the moral component
of an apology, and in the scientific literature, excuses are self-
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serving accounts of a behavior with the goal of reducing per-
ceptions of personal responsibility for the event (Schlenker,
Pontari, & Christopher, 2001). Excuses work by shifting the
cause of the behavior to an uncontrollable, external, or miti-
gating source (Sitkin & Bies, 1993). When people provide
justifications for their behavior, they accept full responsibility,
but they dispute that the behavior was inappropriate by
explaining that it was necessary for achieving a morally supe-
rior purpose (Shaw et al., 2003; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981).
Scott and Lyman (1968) provided the example of a soldier
who kills others in battle (normally, killing is a behavioral
transgression), accepts responsibility for the behavior, but jus-
tifies it by claiming that the behavior was necessary to protect
the country and fellow soldiers.
Of the three types of explanations—apology, excuse, or
justification—excuses tend to be the most prevalent, although
not as much research has focused on apologies as excuses
(Schlenker, 1997). One reason for this motivation to offer an
excuse is the general consensus that an excuse can effectively
distance the transgressor from any or all detrimental conse-
quences of their behavior (Pontari, Schlenker, & Christopher,
2002). Additionally, providing an effective excuse has bene-
fits intra-personally. For instance, Snyder and Higgins (1988)
found that offering an effective excuse can benefit an individ-
ual’s self-esteem level, lessen anxiety, and reduce depression
and negative affect. From an intra- and interpersonal perspec-
tive, effective excuses exonerate the transgressor for causing
the negative outcome by negating or refocusing culpability for
the behavior, which distances the individual from the negative
action (Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988; Crant & Bateman,
1993).
Workplace Meetings and Explanations
The average employee in the USA spends about 6 h per week
attending or preparing for meetings (Rogelberg, Leach, Warr,
& Burnfield, 2006), and about 75% of managers’ working
hours relate to preparing for, attending, or leading meetings
(Allen, Beck, Scott, & Rogelberg, 2014). Despite the amount
of time that employees spend in meetings, researchers and
practitioners have only recently directed attention toward the
systematic study of meetings (e.g., Allen, Lehmann-
Willenbrock, & Rogelberg, 2015). Meetings exist in nearly
every organization regardless of industry, size, culture, or or-
ganizational level, and meetings therefore provide a gateway
or window into the social dynamics of organizations. Thus,
the topic of meeting science, the study of what takes place
prior to, during, and after a meeting, is growing in importance.
Past studies indicate that it is incredibly common for people to
arrive late to meetings (Rogelberg et al., 2014) and that late-
ness to meetings is a sufficiently powerful social transgression
that can lead to anger and a desire to punish the person who
comes late (Mroz & Allen, 2017). As such, by pairing the two
areas of study, the goal of the current paper is to extend knowl-
edge in the explanations literature and in meeting science.
The Current Study
Relative Effects of Explanation Type
Attribution theory, and specifically Weiner’s theory of inter-
personal behavior (Weiner, 2006), informs this study. In order
for an individual to make an attribution of a personal charac-
teristic from a behavior, the person must first engage in a
causal search. People use causal reasoning everyday—to
make decisions (Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006), solve problems
(Cheng&Holyoak, 1985), and interpret the behavior of others
(Cushman, 2013; Cushman & Young, 2011; Lagnado &
Channon, 2008; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997). Despite
the frequency with which people encounter events with non-
agentic causes (e.g., natural phenomena), people prefer to as-
sign causal responsibility to human actors over non-human
causes (Alicke, 1992; Hilton, McClure, & Sutton, 2010;
Lagnado & Channon, 2008).
The theory holds that once individuals encounter a behav-
ioral transgression, they seek to identify, via causal reasoning,
why the transgression occurred. Then, how the identified
cause is cognitively evaluated affects consequent affective
and behavioral responses. Causes are assessed across a variety
of dimensions such as stability, intentionality, locus of causal-
ity, and controllability (Weiner, 2001), although a cause is
unlikely to be evaluated across all dimensions concurrently
(Wickens, Wisenthal, Flora, & Flett, 2011). Excuses, which
shift the cause of the behavior to an uncontrollable, external,
or mitigating source (Sitkin & Bies, 1993), primarily operate
at this stage of the attributional model. An excuse influences
what the victim perceives to be the cause for an event, and, if
successful, results in a judgment of non-responsibility via
minimized controllability and intentionality perceptions, for
instance.
Next, based on the constellation of causal dimensions, such
as high intentionality or controllability, the victim of the trans-
gression determines the transgressor as personally responsible
or non-responsible for the event. Responsibility is a judgment
that reflects whether the transgressor should have done some-
thing differently with respect to the behavior that prompted the
transgression (Weiner, 1985, 1995). Once judged as responsi-
ble, there are few mitigating circumstances that can decrease
negative affect and behavioral intentions (Weiner, 2006).
Rather, mitigating circumstances must occur before responsi-
bility for the event is assigned, which is one factor that may
explain why excuses tend to be so effective. For example,
assuming the actor has control over the outcome, achieving
a higher moral goal is an example of a common mitigating
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factor between causal controllability and assignment of re-
sponsibility (Weiner, 1995). Someone may be late to a meet-
ing because he or she was tending to an unexpectedly sick
parent or child. The cause is internal in that the actor’s behav-
ior (i.e., caring for the sick person) affected the outcome, and
the cause is controllable because the actor could have left the
sick person to fend for him or herself. Assuming the late
person offered an excuse suggesting that caring for the unex-
pectedly sick person led to the lateness, negative reactions
should be minimized. In most other conditions, the observer
would deem the actor morally responsible for coming late to
the meeting. However, because tending to the sick is a high
moral goal (Weiner, 1995) that is likely above punctuality to
most meetings, the observer would not judge the actor as
responsible because the behavior was morally justified.
In contrast to excuses, apologies primarily operate after a
cause is identified and responsibility is assigned, and theymay
work to mitigate negative affective and behavioral responses.
After responsibility judgments, the attributional theory pro-
poses that victims experience negative or positive moral emo-
tions (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). Moral emotions
are affective responses that arise after a consideration of right
and wrong, good and bad, or thoughts about how someone
should have acted (Weiner, 2006). Someone deemed respon-
sible for a transgression spurs a negative moral emotion (com-
monly anger), whereas those considered non-responsible gar-
ner a positive emotion, such as sympathy. The dominant va-
lence of the moral emotion then influences the victim’s behav-
ioral intentions toward the transgressor—to forgive and act
prosocially or to punish, as examples (Rudolph, Roesch,
Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; Weiner et al., 1982).
An apology requires the individual to take full responsibil-
ity for the transgression, repent, and express remorse (Fisher
& Exline, 2006). Because apologies include a self-expression
of responsibility, it is unlikely that apologies influence assess-
ments of causal dimensions. Rather, from a theoretical per-
spective and evidenced by research findings, apologies yield
interpersonal benefits because they alter the affective response
to the transgression. Previous work indicates that apologies
spur forgiveness (Bachman & Guerrero, 2006; Exline,
Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008), decrease aggres-
sion (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989), decrease anger
(Eaton & Struthers, 2006), and increase sympathy (Eaton &
Struthers, 2006). Decreased anger and increased sympathy
should result in more positive behavioral intentions toward
the transgressor (Weiner, 1995).
The lack of an excuse leaves the outcome of the causal
search completely to the victim, which could be influenced
by the fundamental attribution error (Jones & Harris, 1967),
various biases, previous interactions with the transgressor, and
a variety of other factors ultimately leading to a judgment of
responsibility. Given that excuses occur at the very beginning
of the attributional process, they can influence all subsequent
stages of the model, whereas an apology can reduce negative
affective and behavioral responses. Reactions to transgres-
sions unaccompanied by an apology or an excuse, therefore,
will occur without a consideration of any mitigating factors
that may provoke a less negative (or even positive) response.
When considering the effects of no explanation following a
behavioral transgression, two transgressions must be consid-
ered. The first, in the case of this paper, is arriving late to a
meeting. The second is the transgressor not acknowledging
that his or her behavior was inappropriate, as one normative
behavior is to provide an acknowledgment of some variety of
transgressive behavior (Schlenker, 1997). Not only is arriving
late a social norm violation, by not acknowledging the behav-
ior, the late arrival commits a second norm violation. By not
providing an explanation, the late arrival signals that his or her
behavior was not transgressive enough to warrant an excuse or
apology. A Bcompounding effect^ created by two simulta-
neous transgression may occur following no explanation,
which could then exacerbate negative responses. By offering
an excuse or apology, individuals can reduce negative reac-
tions to their poor behavior, but they also avoid violating the
norm of acknowledging improper behavior.
We explore the effects of apologies, excuses, and no expla-
nations in two dependent variables of interest relevant to the
work context. The first, prosocial intentions, is a common
outcome of attribution- and explanation-focused studies
(e.g., Rudolph et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2011; Mroz &
Allen, 2017; Weiner, 1995) because it represents a behavioral
intention theorized to be greatly affected by preceding moral
emotions of anger and sympathy. In the workplace, prosocial
behaviors can be components of organizational citizenship
behaviors, which have been linked to enhanced individual,
unit, and firm performance (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff,
& Blume, 2009). We expect participants will have greater
prosocial intentions toward those who provide an apology or
excuse, compared to those with no explanation. The second,
expected work performance is a work-focused attitudinal
measure of other people’s likely performance on the job in
the future (Hagger, Rentzelas, & Koch, 2014). Theoretically
speaking, Lepine and Van Dyne (2001) explored the potential
responses to peers who are low performers suggesting that
negative attributions toward these low performers influences
the form of helping that may occur or not occur. Building
upon this concern related to low performer attribution, the
focus of the current study is upon how employees view the
potential work behavior and outputs of persons (e.g., peers)
who violate the norm of acknowledging improper behavior.
Specifically, we anticipated that the offense taken for the im-
proper behavior of arriving late (e.g., Mroz & Allen, 2017)
would impact how participants viewed the future behavior of
the transgressor.
Given the possible consequences of not acknowledging a
behavioral transgression, and then not providing an excuse or
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apology to those affected, the following hypotheses are
proposed:
& Hypotheses 1a-1b: Participants who view someone arriv-
ing late to a work meeting who does not provide an expla-
nation, compared to participants who receive an excuse,
will rate the late arrival less favorably in terms of (a) ex-
pected work performance and (b) will express greater
prosocial intentions toward the explanation-provider.
& Hypotheses 2a-2b: Participants who view someone arriv-
ing late to a work meeting who does not provide an expla-
nation, compared to participants who receive an apology,
will rate the late arrival less favorably in terms of (a) ex-
pected work performance and (b) will express greater
prosocial intentions toward the explanation-provider.
Although previous theorizing suggests that any explanation
may be better than no explanation following a behavioral trans-
gression (Shaw et al., 2003), the relative strength of an excuse
versus an apology on ameliorating the negative effects of a trans-
gression is less clear. Shaw et al. (2003) conducted a meta-
analysis of the explanations literature through the lens of fairness
theory and justice, and they found that excuses tended to bemore
beneficial than justifications. However, dependent variables in
the study were largely related to organizational justice percep-
tions so it is not entirely clear how interpersonal perceptions and
behavioral intentions might be affected by either explanation
type. Furthermore, they did not examine apologies.
From the attributional perspective, an excuse could offer a
mitigating circumstance that minimizes assignment of respon-
sibility for the actor’s behavior. As such, the theory predicts
that negative reactions would be minimized. On the other
hand, an apology, wherein the actor fully accepts responsibil-
ity and controllability for the event, offers little avenue to
reduce negative reactions at that point of the model, but it
may promote more positive affective and behavioral reactions
such as forgiveness (Schumann, 2018). Given the competing
predictions that can be drawn from attribution theory and
work on apologies, we ask the following research question:
& Research Question 1a-b: Compared to apology-providers,
will participants (a) rate excuse-providers higher in ex-
pected work performance and (b) express a greater will-
ingness to help?
The Role of Group Emotion
One limitation of existing literature on explanations (Bies &
Sitkin, 1992; Pontari et al., 2002; Scott & Lyman, 1968, etc.)
is that researchers have largely examined the effect of expla-
nations in a tacitly dyadic situation: an actor engages in a
transgressive behavior and then provides or does not provide
some sort of explanation and one observer who was affected
by the behavior then responds. Although such situations do
occur, there are many instances wherein the transgressive be-
havior affects a group of individuals, and how any one of
those individuals responds can influence the responses of
others. Individual behavior is not isolated from contextual
factors, and much of what people do depends on the social
context and the behavior of others (Van Lange & Rusbult,
2012).
From a group dynamics and performance perspective, there
are several reasons why arriving late to a meeting, followed by
an excuse, apology, or no explanation, might have conse-
quences for the group. Some research indicates that the first
communication-based event that occurs in a group setting can
play a significant role in determining the tone for subsequent
interactions and in creating a foundation for additional inter-
actions during the same meeting (Feldman, 1984). What oc-
curs later in the event sequence or conversation is oftentimes
related back to the initial statements (Taylor, 2006), even if the
initial statements are only several seconds long (Gersick,
1988). Importantly, some group outcomes are affected by
what happens before a group officially starts working on a
task such that how well a group engages in productive, posi-
tive conversation before the task can determine the group’s
performance (Eriksen & Dyer, 2004).
One common behavior that occurs in groups is
complaining. Complaining in this context reflects Bkiller
phrases and statements^ that suggest futility, disinterest, or
negative affect (Kauffeld & Meyers, 2009). Kauffeld and
Meyers (2009) as well as Kauffeld and Lehmann-
Willenbrock (2011) examined communicative patterns in
group interactions. They found that when one group member
begins to complain, other members tend to join in, which
subsequently results in poor performance outcomes and great-
er negative affect within the group. In terms of attribution
theory, a group complaining about a transgression may indi-
cate to individuals within the group that the behavior is unac-
ceptable (increasing a judgment of responsibility), thus limit-
ing the effect that any explanation might have on reducing
negative responses. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
& Hypotheses 3a-3b: There will be a main effect of group
complaining such that participants who view a
complaining group compared to a non-complaining group
will (a) rate the late arrival’s work performance more neg-
atively and (b) express fewer prosocial intentions toward
the late arrival.
Individual History with Transgressive Behavior
A further limitation of the extant literature on explanations and
attributions is that the transgressor’s behavioral history with
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respect to a given transgression is rarely considered (Mroz &
Allen, 2017). For example, how others respond when some-
one comes to a meeting late may differ depending on whether
the late arrival is a Blate person^ (i.e., someone who is habit-
ually late) or a rarely late person. From the attributional per-
spective, observers may be more likely to interpret a late per-
son’s vs. a rarely late person’s behavior as controllable, and
judge the person as responsible, regardless of the explanation
the person offers for the lateness, if any. A Blate person,^
whom others view as continuously arriving late and making
no effort to correct the behavior, may be viewed especially
poorly. As such, we hypothesize:
& Hypotheses 4a-4b: There will be main effect of habitual
lateness such that participants who encounter a late arrival
who is always late versus rarely late will (a) rate the late
arrival’s work performance more negatively and (b) ex-
press fewer prosocial intentions toward the late arrival.
Study 1 Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service, an online panel of workers
who complete small tasks for nominal pay. Some studies in-
dicate that users of the service are more representative and
diverse than typical student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Landers & Behrend, 2015; Paolacci, Chandler,
& Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants were compensated $0.70. The
study was advertised as an investigation of attitudes toward
workplace meetings, and participants were required to be at
least part-time employees who regularly attend meetings for
1 h or more per week. Forty-two participants failed at least one
of the validation items (instructional items such as Bselect
agree^ to gauge whether participants were reading survey
items) and were removed for subsequent analyses. We also
conducted analyses with all participants included, and conclu-
sions were similar, although we do point out differences in the
results section. The final sample consisted of 558 respondents
between the ages of 19 and 73 (M = 37.28, SD = 10.57) who
worked an average of 39.41 h each week (SD = 9.01). The
majority (59.4%) of participants were women.
Measures and Materials
Video Vignettes Participants viewed one of 12 video vi-
gnettes. Each vignette was a short, 1 min 30 s video depicting
a workplace meeting. The videos showed meeting attendees
arriving to a meeting, discussing the time the meeting was
scheduled to start (1 p.m.), mentioning who was not there
yet, and then waiting for 8 min. Meeting attendees consisted
of three women and one man, and the late arrival was a wom-
an. After the 8-min waiting period, there was a short discus-
sion about the person who was late, and then the late person
came to the meeting at 1:10 p.m. During the waiting period,
meeting attendees used their cell phones, reviewed papers, or
made very minimal small talk. The waiting period was shown
at approximately 16× speed, such that the 8-min waiting pe-
riod took 30 s in real time. We increased video speed for the
waiting period to reduce participant fatigue and dropout, both
of whichmay bemore likely if the participants are not actively
engaged (or interested) in the study (Hoerger, 2010; Galesic,
2006; Galesic & Bosnjak, 2009). A clock was evident as an
overlay on the bottom, right-hand corner of the video and
within the meeting room itself. A professional videographer
recorded all videos, and videos were edited such that, aside
from the manipulated factors, all other material remained con-
stant (e.g., every video used the same recording of the waiting
period and lines that did not change across conditions).
Performance Expectation Performance expectation was eval-
uated using a five-item measure developed by Hagger et al.
(2014). Participants considered the late arrival and rated how
they thought that person would perform at work in a variety of
areas when compared to other employees (1 = one of the
worst, 5 = one of the best) across five dimensions. Sample
items include Bquality of work^ and Bdependability.^
Prosocial Intentions Prosocial intentions were measured using
a three-item scale developed by Mroz and Allen (2017).
Participants read three situations that described the person
who arrived late to the meeting asking for help in a work
situation (e.g., BThe late arrival asks to review your meeting
notes with you so she can get caught up on what she missed in
the meeting^), and then indicated how likely they would be to
help the late person from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely
likely).
Design and Procedure
A 2 (group complaining: yes, no) × 2 (habitually late arrival:
yes, no) × 3 (explanation type: apology, excuse, or none)
between-participants design was used. Upon entering the sur-
vey and providing informed consent, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the 12 experimental conditions. In
each condition, the participant watched a video depicting a
workplace meeting with the following instructions: BAs you
watch, try to imagine that you are an attendee at this meeting.
Later on, you will be asked to think about how you would
respond in the situation shown in the video. Remember, we
want to know how you might behave if you were in this
scenario so don’t worry about providing the ‘right’
answer—there is no right or wrong answer!^ The opening
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lines and the waiting period in the videos were the same across
all conditions, and all manipulations occurred after the waiting
section. Manipulated portions of the vignettes are described in
the appendix.
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal
consistency estimates, where appropriate, for all focal vari-
ables. A series of 2 (group complaining: yes, no) × 2 (late
arrival habitually late: yes, no) × 3 (explanation for lateness:
none, excuse, apology) between-participants ANOVAs were
conducted on expected work performance and prosocial in-
tentions to test study hypotheses. Planned contrasts were also
estimated to test group differences hypothesized in
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics
for each of the experimental conditions, whereas Tables 3 and
4 display results of the hypothesis testing.
Expected Work Performance
The test of the overall model was significant, F(11, 546) =
11.64, p < 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.19; no main effects and planned
comparisons were examined. Hypotheses 1a and 2a predicted
that participants would rate excuse-providers as higher in ex-
pected work performance than late arrivals who provided no
explanation (H1a), whereas H2a predicted the same effect for
apology-providers for those who gave no explanation. The
main effect of explanation type was significant, F(2, 546) =
8.27, p < 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.03. Planned comparison tests revealed
that participants rated individuals who provided an excuse
more highly (M = 2.84, SD = 0.73) than those who provided
no explanation (M = 2.61, SD = 0.57), b = 0.25, p < 0.001,
95% CI [0.13, 0.37], Cohen’s d = 0.35, which supported
Hypothesis 1a. On the other hand, late arrivals who provided
an apology (M = 2.73, SD = 0.66) were not rated more highly
than those who gave no explanation (M = 2.61, SD = 0.57),
b = 0.12, p = 0.07, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24], Cohen’s d = 0.19,
meaning that Hypothesis 2a was not supported. In the analysis
with all participants included, this difference was significant.
Research question 1a asked whether excuse-providers would
be more highly rated than apology-providers. The excuse-
provider (M = 2.84, SD = 0.73) was rated more highly than
the apology-providers (M = 2.73, SD = 0.66), b = 0.13, p =
0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.26], Cohen’s d = 0.16.
Hypothesis 3a was supported, which predicted a main ef-
fect for group complaining such that participants rated late
arrivals more favorably when other members in the group
did not complain (M = 2.78, SD = 0.69) compared to when
others did complain (M = 2.67, SD = 0.62), F(1, 546) = 5.30,
p = 0.02, ƞp
2 = 0.01. Hypothesis 4a predicted a main effect of
habitual lateness, such that participants would rate the habitu-
ally late arrival as a significantly worse employee (M = 2.48,
SD = 0.56) than the person who was rarely late (M = 2.99,
SD = 0.66). Hypothesis 4a was supported, F(1, 546) =
103.67, p < 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.16. All interactive effects were also
tested, and none were significant (see Table 3).
Prosocial intentions
The test of the overall model was significant, F(11, 545) =
3.82, p < 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.07. Hypotheses 1b and 2b proposed
that participants express a greater willingness to help late ar-
rivals who provided either an excuse (H1b) or apology (H2b)
compared to late arrivals who offered no explanation. The
main effect of explanation type was significant, F(2, 545) =
7.35, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.03, and planned comparison tests in-
dicated that participants would be more likely to help excuse-
providers (M = 3.75, SD = 0.98) compared to late arrivals who
provided no explanation (M = 3.40, SD = 1.00), b = 0.38,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.57], Cohen’s d = 0.35, which
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of study variables in Study 1
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age 37.28 10.57 –
2. Gender 1.60 0.49 0.04 –
3. Complaining 1.48 0.50 0.03 − 0.01 –
4. Habitually late 1.47 0.50 − 0.06 0.07 − 0.01 –
5. No explanation vs. any 0.28 0.96 − 0.01 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 –
6. Apology vs. excuse 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.02 0.02 − 0.03 0.05 –
7. Performance expectation 2.73 0.66 0.08 0.09* 0.09* 0.39*** 0.13** 0.07 (0.92)
8. Prosocial intentions 3.55 1.00 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.19*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.41*** (0.87)
N = 557. Estimates of internal consistency displayed on diagonal where appropriate. For gender, 1 =male, 2 = female. For complaining, 1 = yes, 2 = no.
For habitually late, 1 = yes, 2 = no. For explanation type, no explanation versus any explanation coded as none = −1, excuse = 1, apology = 1. For
apology vs. excuse, explanation coded as none = 0, excuse = 1, apology = −1
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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provides support for Hypothesis 1b. On the other hand, par-
ticipants were not more likely to want to help a late arrival
who provided an apology (M = 3.49, SD = 1.00) compared to
someone who gave no explanation (M = 3.40, SD = 1.00), b =
0.09, p = 0.38, 95% CI [0.11, 0.29], Cohen’s d = 0.09, such
that Hypothesis 2b was not supported. However, participants
indicated a greater willingness to help excuse-providers (M =
3.75, SD = 0.98) compared to apology-providers (M = 3.49,
SD = 1.00), b = 0.29, p = 0.006, 95% CI [0.08, 0.49],
Cohen’s d = 0.26, thereby answering research question 1b.
Hypothesis 4b was not supported, as the main effect of
group complaining on prosocial intentions was not significant,
F(1, 545) = 0.85, p = 0.36, ƞp
2 = 0.00. Hypothesis 5b predict-
ed that participants would be more willing to help the rarely
late person compared to the habitually late person. This hy-
pothesis was supported, F(1, 545) = 19.87, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 =
0.04, as participants indicated they would be less willing to
help the habitually late person (M = 3.37, SD = 1.00) com-
pared to the rarely late person (M = 3.74, SD = 0.96).
Interaction effects, reported in Table 4, were not significant.
Study 2
Despite the strong pattern of results observed in Study 1, ex-
perimental methods are artificial in nature and can suffer from
a lack of generalizability to applied settings (Berkowitz &
Donnerstein, 1982; Falk & Heckman, 2009). To extend this
paper, we conducted an online survey in order to replicate
earlier findings and extend them to real work settings.
Specifically, we could not consider two primary factors in
Study 1 that may have influenced the results: how familiar
the participant was with the late arrival and the relevance of
the meeting to which the individual arrived late. In Study 1,
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for
each of the 12 conditions in Study
1
Expected performance Prosocial intentions
Condition M SD n M SD n
Excuse
1. Habitually late, complaining 2.60 0.65 53 3.36 1.07 53
2. Habitually late, no complaining 2.61 0.64 53 3.69 0.95 53
3. Rarely late, complaining 3.01 0.63 45 4.07 0.92 45
4. Rarely late, no complaining 3.26 0.80 42 3.99 0.76 42
Apology
5. Habitually late, complaining 2.42 0.60 43 3.35 0.93 43
6. Habitually late, no complaining 2.43 0.45 41 3.31 1.08 41
7. Rarely late, complaining 2.99 0.60 45 3.61 0.95 45
8. Rarely late, no complaining 3.10 0.67 36 3.70 1.02 36
No explanation
9. Habitually late, complaining 2.37 0.45 58 3.30 0.96 58
10. Habitually late, no complaining 2.46 0.48 49 3.18 1.04 49
11. Rarely late, complaining 2.71 0.52 46 3.42 1.06 45
12. Rarely late, no complaining 2.94 0.65 47 3.70 0.90 47
Table 3 ANOVA results of
expected work performance in
Study 1
Source SS df MS F ƞp
2
Overall 46.06 11 4.19 11.64*** 0.19
Complaining 1.91 1 1.91 5.30* 0.01
Habitually late 37.29 1 37.29 103.67*** 0.16
Explanation type 5.95 2 2.98 8.27*** 0.03
Complain × habitual 0.92 1 0.92 2.57 0.01
Complain × explanation 0.26 2 0.13 0.37 0.00
Habitual × explanation 1.05 2 0.53 1.47 0.01
Complain × habitual × explanation 0.10 2 0.05 0.14 0.00
Error 196.40 546 0.36
Total 242.46 557
N = 558. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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given that it was a video vignette depicting a contrived group
to which the participant ostensibly belonged, we could not
examine whether how well the participant knew the late arriv-
er affected how the participant responded to the lateness. In
Study 2, because we focus on actual situations in which some-
one arrived late to a meeting, we seek to replicate Study 1’s
findings while controlling for how well the participant knows
the late arrival. Likewise, meeting relevance is a factor that
previous work (Mroz & Allen, 2017) suggests influences the
reactions individuals have when someone arrives late to a
meeting such that more personally relevant meetings lead to
more strongly negative reactions. Study 2 also seeks to control
for the effects of meeting relevance.
Study 2 Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited via MTurk and were paid
$0.50 for completing the study, which was described as
a survey of experiences with workplace meetings.
Participants were required to be full- or part-time em-
ployees who regularly attend meetings. Upon entering
the survey, participants read the definition of a work-
place meeting and were instructed to think of their last
work meeting. Then, participants provided information
on the meeting such as whether someone arrived late.
Of the 553 total participants, 223 (40%) reported that
someone arrived late so these participants completed
the rest of the study. Remaining participants were trans-
ferred to a different study. Participants who indicated
that someone arrived late then provided some informa-
tion about the late person and completed several mea-
sures. Regarding the late arrival, participants reported
whether the person provided an excuse (or not), an apol-
ogy (or not), and the content of the excuse and/or
apology.
Although an important purpose of Study 2 was to replicate
and extend the results from Study 1, excuses and apologies did
not occur independently of one another in the real work set-
ting. That is, when someone offered an excuse, an apology
followed 71% of the time. Additionally, only 16% of late
arrivals who did not give an excuse did give an apology.
Overall, cell sizes were relatively unequal and sometimes
small (apology only: n = 38; excuse only: n = 15; no excuse,
no apology: n = 81; excuse, apology: n = 89). The final sample
consisted of 223 employees (57% ofwhomwere women) who
worked an average of 38.51 h per week (SD = 9.31).
Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 70 (M = 36.00, SD =
12.05). Example job titles of participants included nurse,
package handler, credit analyst, certified public accountant
(CPA), data analyst, engineer, teacher, and sales manager.
Measures
Control Variables: Familiarity with Late Arrival and Meeting
Relevance We included two control variables in our study, as
each is theoretically relevant and were related to the outcome
variables of interest. In previous work, meeting relevance,
represented as a component of the overall degree of a behav-
ioral transgression, was demonstrated to influence the attribu-
tional process associated with reactions to meeting lateness
(Mroz & Allen, 2017). As such, we argue that meeting rele-
vance, as an indicator of the severity of the transgression
(more severe in the observer’s eye if the meeting is relevant
versus non-relevant) is a potential third variable that must be
accounted for. Likewise, a participant’s familiarity and quality
of relationship with the late arrival would theoretically impact
whether they intend to behave prosocially toward that person
in the future, as well as the participants’ estimation of the late
arrival’s work performance. This treatment of control vari-
ables is consistent with best practice recommendations in the
field regarding statistical control (Becker, 2005; Becker et al.,
2016).
Table 4 ANOVA results of
prosocial intentions in Study 1 Source SS df MS F ƞp
2
Overall 39.98 11 3.64 3.82*** 0.07
Complaining 0.81 1 0.81 0.85 0.00
Habitually late 19.87 1 19.87 20.88*** 0.04
Explanation type 14.71 2 7.35 7.73*** 0.03
Complain × habitual 0.08 1 0.08 0.08 0.00
Complain × explanation 0.23 2 0.11 0.12 0.00
Habitual × explanation 1.02 2 0.51 0.54 0.00
Complain × habitual × explanation 4.04 2 2.02 2.12 0.01
Error 518.45 545 0.95
Total 558.43 556
N = 558. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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Familiarity with the person who arrived late was assessed
with six items we developed for the purposes of this study.
Using a five-point strongly disagree to strongly agree scale,
participants indicated howwell they knew the personwhowas
late. Sample items included BI know the individual well,^ BI
often see the individual outside of work,^ and BI work often
with the individual.^
Meeting relevance was assessed via Sawyer’s (1992) goal
and process clarity scale. A similar version has been adapted
to meetings (Allen & Rogelberg, 2013). Participants thought
of their last workplace meeting and responded to seven items
such as BThe meeting was relevant to my job^ and BThe meet-
ing helped me accomplish my duties and responsibilities^
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Performance Expectation and Prosocial Intentions The mea-
sures included in Study 1 were re-used.
Results
Table 5 includes the descriptive statistics and correlations of
study variables. The goal of Study 2 was to explore whether
differences between explanation types in how individuals
view and intend to behave toward late arrivals persist in actual
work settings, while accounting for more contextual factors to
enhance external validity. To extend the findings from Study
1, we estimated two ANCOVAs to examine whether provid-
ing an apology or an excuse (or both) versus no explanation
affected (a) how employees perceive the late arrival’s work
performance and (b) how likely employees are to engage in
helping behaviors toward the late arrival. Models used a 2
(excuse: provided, not provided) × 2 (apology: provided, not
provided) factorial design with meeting relevance and famil-
iarity with late arrival as covariates.
In the test of performance expectations, the overall model
was significant, F(5, 217) = 18.52, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.30.
Meeting relevance [F(1, 217) = 4.35, p = 0.04, ƞp2 = 0.02]
and familiarity with late arrival [F(1, 217) = 51.03,
p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.19] were significant effects. Consistent with
Study 1 results, participants rated their co-workers who pro-
vided an excuse (M = 3.68, SD = 0.72) more highly than those
who provided no excuse (M = 3.28, SD = 0.67), F(1, 217) =
4.44, p = 0.04, ƞp2 = 0.02. There was no effect of apology
versus no apology, and the excuse × apology interaction was
not significant.
For prosocial behavioral intentions, the overall model was
also significant, F(5, 213) = 12.44, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.23. The
familiarity covariate was significant [F(1, 213) = 44.19,
p < 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.17], but the effect of meeting relevance
was not. Neither the excuse [F(1, 213) = 0.20, p = 0.67, ƞp
2
< 0.01] nor the apology [F(1, 213) = 3.33, p = 0.07, ƞp2 =
0.02] effects reached significance, but there was a significant
excuse × apology interaction, F(1, 213) = 4.86, p = 0.03,
ƞp2 = 0.02. The interaction indicated that providing an apolo-
gy was most beneficial when coupled with an excuse (M =
3.84, SE = 0.12), whereas offering an apology without an ex-
cusemade no difference.When no covariates were included in
the model, the interaction was not significant, but there was a
significant main effect of excuse provision such that partici-
pants were more likely to help the late arrival when provided
with an excuse compared to when no excuse was given.
Table 6 displays the condition means. The interaction is
graphed in Fig. 1.
To help explore the interaction further, we questioned why
including familiarity as a control variable (much more so than
meeting relevance) influenced the interactive effect. One rea-
son may have been that transgressors were more likely to
apologize or offer an excuse when they had a pre-existing
relationship with the victim. To that end, we conducted an
ANOVA on familiarity with the late arrival with excuse
Table 5 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of study variables in Study 2
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age 36.02 11.89 –
2. Gender 1.57 0.50 0.03 –
3. Meeting relevance 3.58 1.02 − 0.06 − 0.03 (0.93)
4. Familiarity with late arrival 3.18 0.84 − 0.05 − 0.02 0.25*** –
5. Excuse given 0.57 0.49 − 0.02 0.19** − 0.19** − 0.23** –
6. Apology given 0.46 0.50 0.07 − 0.13 − 0.26*** − 0.28*** 0.54*** (0.79)
7. Performance expectation 3.45 0.72 0.11 − 0.01 0.27*** 0.51*** 0.18*** 0.26*** (0.91)
8. Prosocial intentions 3.65 1.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.45*** 0.16* 0.21*** 0.36*** (0.87)
N = 223. Estimates of internal consistency displayed on diagonal where appropriate. For gender, 1 =male, 2 = female. For apology and excuse, 0 = not
present, 1 = present
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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provision (yes, no) and apology provision (yes, no) as fixed
factors. The model was significant [F(3, 219) = 6.99,
p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.09]; there was no effect of excuse provision
and there was no interaction between apology and excuse
provision, but results did demonstrate that victims reported
greater previous interactions with people who provided an
apology (M = 3.39, SD = 0.77) compared to transgressors
who provided no apology (M = 2.93, SD = 0.84) [F(1,
219) = 7.03, p = 0.009, ƞp
2 = 0.03].
Discussion
The purpose of the studies reported in this paper was to bring
the explanations literature to bear on an all-too-common
workplace phenomenon, that of lateness to workplace meet-
ings. In the explanations area, results from Study 1 indicated
that, for both expected work performance and prosocial inten-
tions, no explanation for a transgressive behavior (i.e., why
one showed up late to a meeting) engendered more negative
responses than providing an excuse. We also found in Study 1
that participants considered the habitually late person as being
a worse performer at work than the rarely late person.
Furthermore, participants were more likely to consider
helping the rarely late person than the habitually late person.
Regarding our research questions, we found that excuses com-
pared to apologies produced higher expectations of work per-
formance and prosocial intentions.
Participants who viewed a non-complaining group in
Study 1 rated the late arrival (regardless of explanation type)
more positively in terms of work performance, but
complaining did not affect participants’ prosocial intentions.
The complaining of the group may have Binfected^ the partic-
ipant with a generally negative attitude toward the late arrival,
but the complaining did not have a strong enough effect to
markedly influence behavioral intentions. In many group set-
tings, emotional responses from one or more members can
extend to other group members. Emotional contagion may
explain these findings, as it is a process whereby people auto-
matically tend to synchronize and mimic their verbal and non-
verbal cues and behavior with another person, which results in
the two people, or a group of people, sharing the same emo-
tions and reactions (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994).
In Study 2, results from Study 1 were largely replicated,
although one key difference must be considered when relating
the two studies. In Study 1, explanation type was a three-level
factor comprised of apology, excuse, or no explanation,
whereas in Study 2 there was a separate factor each for apol-
ogy and excuse (both of which included two levels of provid-
ed, not provided). Therefore, although several conditions in
Study 2 were the same as in Study 1, we also had one new
condition of apology paired with an excuse. In terms of re-
sults, we first found that participants believed their co-workers
who arrived late to a meeting and provided an excuse were
higher-performing employees than late people who did not
provide an excuse. This effect was significant when control-
ling for meeting relevance and familiarity with the late arrival,
both of which are theoretically relevant control variables that
have been demonstrated in previous work to affect reactions to
behavioral transgressions. As in Study 1, there was no effect
of apology provision.
Further in Study 2, we found that excuse and apology pro-






















Apology No ApologyFig. 1 The excuse × apology
interaction found in Study 2.
Offering an excuse and an
apology produced the most
benefit, whereas an excuse with
no apology was detrimental.
Without an excuse, apologies had
no effect
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for each of the four conditions in Study 2
Condition M SD Number
DV: expected work performance
1. Apology only 3.47 0.62 38
2. Excuse only 3.56 0.47 15
3. Apology and excuse 3.70 0.75 81
4. No apology nor excuse 3.20 0.67 89
DV: prosocial intentions
1. Apology only 3.60 1.22 38
2. Excuse only 3.11 1.14 15
3. Apology and excuse 3.99 1.04 80
4. No apology nor excuse 3.44 1.10 86
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apologies were most beneficial when paired with an excuse,
and, indeed, an excuse was only effective when combined
with an apology. Although the interactive results are encour-
aging, we are hesitant to draw any firm conclusions given the
unequal cell sizes, modest effect, and the finding that the in-
teraction was not significant without the control variables of
meeting relevance and familiarity with the late arrival includ-
ed in the model. Theoretically, people are more likely to help
others with whom they already share a history of interactions
or the prospect of continued interactions compared to
strangers or individuals they may interact with only once
(Greitemeyer, Rudolph, & Weiner, 2003). This theoretical
proposition was supported by the strong correlation between
familiarity with the late arrival and prosocial intentions (r =
0.45) in Study 2. As such, without accounting for the strong
connection between pre-existing relationship and potential
helping behaviors, it is possible that the interactive effect be-
tween apologies and excuses was obscured simply from a
statistical standpoint. From a behavioral perspective, victim’s
expectations of an explanation and a transgressor’s likelihood
to explain might be influenced by their relationship prior to the
transgression. In Study 2, victims indicated more familiarity
with transgressors who apologized (M = 3.40) compared to
those who did not (M = 2.93). Additional experimental studies
that examine the interplay between apologies and excuses are
needed that focus on situations in which the two co-occur, as
the control offered by such designs could allow for more ex-
tensive control of the issue of pre-existing relationships.
In sum and with respect to explanations, we established that,
in most cases, offering an excuse that shifts perceived responsi-
bility for the cause of an event to an external force appears to
produce more positive reactions among victims when compared
to not offering an explanation or only apologizing. This effect
persisted when accounting for a group’s complaining behaviors
and an individual’s history with the transgression in question
(Study 1) as well as the importance of themeeting and a victim’s
prior relationship with the transgressor (Study 2). Interestingly,
we found no evidence to suggest that offering an apology pro-
vided any benefit over ignoring the transgression.
Although the power of an excuse was fairly consistent in
the studies we reported on, other effects were less clear and
raise an additional question: to what extent does the nature of
the transgression influence responses to an explanation? We
focused our studies on one specific transgression—lateness to
a workplace meeting—yet perhaps more severe or personally
significant transgressions could lead to a different pattern of
results. Many studies in this research area use a critical inci-
dent technique to prompt participants to think of the last time
someone did something that offended them at work and then
to write the explanation offered by the transgressor (e.g.,
Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tata,
2002; Zheng, van Dijke, Leunissen, Giurge, & De Cremer,
2016). Much attention has been focused on the explanation
but fairly little work has explored the properties of the event
that is being explained.
Considering the nature of the transgression may shed some
light on why apologies seemed to have no effect over ignoring
arriving late. Specifically, lateness to a meeting may not be
enough of a personal transgression—one in which the victim
feels personally attacked or offended—for the transgressor to
offer an effective, complete apology or for the victim to care if
they received an apology. An effective apology must typically
include an expression of remorse, an offer to repair the situa-
tion, and an acceptance of responsibility (Anderson, Linden, &
Habra, 2006; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, & Montada, 2004;
Schumann, 2014). Transgressors could be less likely to dedi-
cate the effort to crafting a full apology if they believe that their
behavior was not severe or that the apology would provide little
benefit (Schumann, 2018). Future work in this area could take a
Bflipped^ approach wherein properties of the transgression are
manipulated while the explanation is held constant (whereas
usually the reverse is examined), and the results of which could
help contribute to the question of how the transgression itself
affects how people respond, regardless of the explanation.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
While our studies certainly prompt new questions and areas of
investigation, our pattern of results expands on the existing lit-
erature in several ways. First, our findings suggest that how
individuals behave in the meeting context can influence inter-
personal relationships throughout the organization.Whereas ear-
lier studies (e.g., Mroz & Allen, 2017; Rogelberg et al., 2014)
examined the effects of arriving late versus not arriving late on
experiences in the meeting, the present investigation extends to
what individuals should do if they are late or otherwise engage
in a transgressive meeting behavior. Consistent with findings
reported by Luksyte, Waite, Avery, and Roy (2013), lateness
behaviors can influence career-relevant outcomes such as ad-
vancement. In the current studies, habitual lateness was an ex-
ceptionally strong predictor of expected work performance.
And, although the participants were not exclusively managers,
additional research should extend these findings within a man-
agerial sample. From a practical perspective, people who arrive
late to meetings should take special care to offer an excuse or an
apology if the situation presents itself.
Second, these findings have important implications for the
explanations literature. Very few studies, if any, have exam-
ined how explanations function in a context involving groups.
By focusing on group complaining, we provided one of many
possible group-related factors that could influence how people
respond to given explanations following a behavioral trans-
gression. Explanations that are most effective in dyadic set-
tings may not necessarily translate to group environments, and
though not studied in the current paper, differences may be
particularly prevalent with apologies. For instance, a central
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component of an apology is to offer to repair to the situation
and to behave better in the future (Schumann, 2018), yet that
may be more difficult—and potentially less likely to be seen
as sincere—when applied to an entire group of victims in a
meeting context. Additionally, no study, to our knowledge,
has explored the relative strength of apologies versus excuses
versus no explanations in terms of mitigating the negative
effects of a behavioral transgression. Despite finding near-
consistent support that no explanation tended to produce the
worst reactions, there may still be some situations and trans-
gressions when not explaining the behavior could have bene-
fits for the transgressor. We discuss some of these possibilities
in the following section. We also demonstrated that an indi-
vidual’s history with transgressive behavior was an important
factor in how people responded both attitudinally and, poten-
tially, behaviorally to the transgressor.
Third, the findings from Study 2 raise some important
questions concerning the applicability of the explanations lit-
erature to real social interactions. The literature includes quite
clear, delineated definitions of excuses, apologies, and justifi-
cations. Although the current series of studies did not focus on
justifications, in Study 2, we found that each explanation type
in terms of apologies and excuses was not entirely indepen-
dent of the other types. Participants very rarely reported that
someone late to a meeting provided only an excuse or only an
apology. Overwhelmingly (71% of all cases when an expla-
nation was given), late arrivals gave an apology and an
excuse—meaning that the actor initially accepted responsibil-
ity, and then subsequently attempted to shift responsibility for
the event to an external force. This finding suggests that peo-
ple may use explanations differently in actual social interac-
tions (i.e., combine multiple explanations with seemingly con-
tradictory functions) compared to isolated lab situations.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with all studies, there are number of limitations that must
be considered before drawing solid conclusions. The first lim-
itation of this paper is that the effect sizes we observed regard-
ing the influence of explanations on post-transgression reac-
tions were modest even when the effect was significant. In
Study 1, as an example, the overall model of work perfor-
mance explained approximately 19% of the variability, yet
only 3% was accounted for by explanation type (compared
to 16% by habitual lateness). Similarly, in Study 2, the one
model predicted 30% of the variance in anticipated perfor-
mance of a co-worker, but only 1–2% was accounted for by
the explanation following arriving late to a meeting. Because
these are relatively small effects, challenges may emerge in
replicating the findings, particularly in more complex models,
those that include fewer data points, or models that have great-
er nuance than those presented here.
That said, in the models tested here, intended helping be-
haviors and a colleague’s expected performance at work are
variables that can be affected by many factors, some of which
were accounted for in these studies, and it is somewhat surpris-
ing that offering a very simple explanation after arriving late to
a single meeting could have such a large effect on these more
global outcomes, especially in Study 2 when participants rated
a work colleague. Examining dependent variables more prox-
imal to the transgression, such as ratings of the individual meet-
ing or state affect at the time, would likely lead to stronger
effect sizes and more shared variance between explanation
types and dependent variable scores. Future research might
take this approach to gauge the immediate effects of excuses
as compared to apologies or no explanations. Additionally,
given the prevalence of meeting lateness in organizations
(i.e., about 40% of meetings, Rogelberg et al., 2014), any im-
provement in courteous behavior in relation to this very com-
mon workplace practice may prove meaningful in other ways.
Second, vignette studies such as Study 1, even video vi-
gnettes, suffer from a level of artificiality that is common
across many experimental designs. We asked participants in
Study 1 to report how they would behave in a given situation,
not how they actually behaved in a lateness scenario.
Although this design did allow a high level of control, thus
eliminating many potentially confounding variables, the ap-
plicability of the findings to work environments is somewhat
limited as a result. However, we addressed the limitations of
Study 1 by conducting a survey in Study 2 wherein partici-
pants reported actual lateness scenarios. We largely replicated
the primary findings of the experimental study in the survey.
Additionally, we established other, difficult-to-manipulate fac-
tors (i.e., meeting relevance and familiarity with the late arriv-
al) that affected how people responded to meeting lateness.
Third, to control for the effect of gender, the late arrival
depicted in Study 1 was consistent across all conditions and
was a woman. This control allows for the effects of gender to
be ruled out as a potential confounding variable, but there is
evidence to suggest that people respond differently to the
same apology and context depending on whether a man or
women offers the apology (e.g., Walfisch, Van Dijk, &
Kark, 2013; Wei & Ran, 2017). It is possible that the pattern
of results could be different if the late arrival were a man, or if
the gender composition of the group were altered. For in-
stance, Walfisch et al. (2013) reported that apologies were
more effective for male versus female transgressors, and es-
pecially so when a man apologized to a woman. Despite that
finding, we did not observe an effect of gender. In Study 2,
participants reported the gender of the late arrival and that
factor did not appear to influence how participants’ reacted
to meeting lateness, regardless of the gender of the participant.
Nonetheless, future research should attempt to integrate work
on gender and the explanations literature to provide a more
complete picture of the interplay between these factors.
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Fourth, previous work on meeting lateness suggests that
how late someone is has a large effect on how individuals
react to the late arrival, with stronger reactions following
greater lateness (Allen, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Rogelberg,
2018; Mroz & Allen, 2017; Rogelberg et al., 2014). In Study
1, we held lateness across all conditions constant at 10 min for
two main reasons. First, if we had varied lateness with even
two levels (perhaps 5 min and 10 min), the design may have
been too cumbersome to interpret with at least 24 conditions.
Second, past research indicates that most negative effects of
lateness begin at around 10 min and increases as lateness
increases so, to ensure a strong enough effect, we set
lateness to 10 min. Likewise, Rogelberg et al. (2014) found
that when someone is late to a meeting, the meeting leader
typically waits to begin the meeting until the late person ar-
rives, which is why we included that component in our exper-
iment. In Study 2, the survey of actual work experiences,
participants reported whether someone other than themselves
arrived late, and then they attempted to estimate how late (in
minutes). Of participants who recalled how late someone ar-
rived, the average degree of lateness was 8 min. Participants
did not report if the meeting had already started when the late
person arrived. Future research should explore if the type of
explanation that best minimizes negative responses to lateness
varies depending on whether the meeting has started. For ex-
ample, it is possible that providing no explanation may be
preferable to an excuse or an apology when a meeting has
already started because providing an explanation could draw
attention to the lateness. Concurrently, no work, to our knowl-
edge, has explored the effects of arriving late to an already-
started meeting, and it is possible that the negative effects
observed for late-starting meetings could be diminished.
Conclusion
Given the ubiquity of meetings in organizations as well as the
prevalence of lateness to those meetings, the forgoing studies
are a timely treatment of the attitudinal and attributional ef-
fects of others toward the late arrivers. Theoretically speaking,
the studies demonstrate that commonplace mundane interac-
tions in organizations appear to create changes in intentions
toward others, extending the attribution theory. Practically
speaking, the studies demonstrate that individuals in organi-
zations should not overlook or underestimate the importance
of timeliness and the behaviors associated with excuses given
for lateness. Our hope is that these studies further inspire
others to investigate the nuances of the prevalent workplace
activity of the meeting.
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Appendix
Underlined text was varied to change group complaining, bold
indicates whether the arrival is habitually or rarely late, and
italicized text represents what the late arrival said after
arriving.
Example: Complaining × habitually late × excuse
Attendee 21: This is ridiculous. I can’t believe we’re still
waiting on Kathleen.
Attendee 1:That’s just Kathleen. She is always late to
stuff like this.
Attendee 22: Really? I think people should try to be on-
time. I hope she gets here soon.
Attendee 3: This meeting is a waste of time anyway.
Late arrival: Okay, I made it. My boss gave me some-
thing to do right before the meeting was scheduled to
start, and I had to finish it before coming. Thanks for
waiting. Ready to get started?
Alternative lines for complaining (underlined): A21: I wonder
if Kathleen will get here soon.We really should start; A22: Oh,
maybe she will get here soon; A3: We might not need all the
time during the meeting anyway.
Alternative lines for lateness (italicized): None: Okay, I
made it. Thanks for waiting. Ready to get started? Apology:
Okay, I made it. I am so sorry that I am late. It’s completelymy
fault. I just lost track of time. Thanks for waiting. Ready to get
started?
Alternative lines for habitual lateness (bolded): A1: It’s
unlike Kathleen to be late. She is usually on-time.
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